Abstract. The first part of this paper considers the diamond structures which were first introduced and applied in the herding attack by Kelsey and Kohno [7] . We present a new method for the construction of a diamond structure with 2 d chaining values the message complexity of which is O(2 n+d 2 ) . Here n is the length of the compression function used. The aforementioned complexity was (with intuitive reasoning) suggested to be true in [7] and later disputed by Blackburn et al. in [3].
Introduction
Hash functions are mappings which take as input arbitrary strings over a fixed alphabet (usually assumed to be the binary alphabet {0, 1}) and return a (binary) string of a fixed length as their output. These functions are used in various cryptographic protocols such as message authentication, digital signatures and electronic voting. In order to be useful in cryptographic context, hash functions need to have three traditional properties, preimage resistance, second preimage resistance and collision resistance.
An ideal hash function H from the set {0, 1} * of all binary strings into the set {0, 1} n of all binary strings of length n is a random oracle: for each x ∈ {0, 1} * , the value H(x) ∈ {0, 1} n is chosen uniformly at random.
Merkle and Damgård [4, 13] devised a method for constructing hash functions from a family of fixed size collision-free compression functions. In this method, the message to be hashed is divided into blocks and padded; the hash value is computed by the repeated (iterative) use of the compression function to the message blocks and to the previous value of the computation. The result of the final computation is then defined to be the hash value of the message. Both Merkle and Damgård were able to prove that if the length (in blocks) of the message is appended to the original message and the result is padded and hashed in the previous iterative fashion using a collision resistant compression function, then the resulting hash function is also collision resistant.
The iterative method for constructing hash functions, from a single compression function, has been found quite susceptible to several different types of attacks. Joux [6] demonstrated that, for iterated hash functions (of length n), 2 k -collisions can be found with O(k · 2 n/2 ) compression function queries; the respective number of queries for a random oracle hash function is much higher [15] . Multicollision attacks against more generalized hash function structures have been studied in [14, 5, 9, 10] , and [11] . A second preimage attack against long messages was first constructed by Kelsey and Schneier [8] while in [7] Kelsey and Kohno presented a new form of attack named the herding attack.
The herding attack relies on diamond structures, a tree construction where several hash values (leaves of the tree) are herded towards one (fixed) hash value (the root). Diamond structures proved to be very useful in attack construction. They were employed in [1] and [2] to create herding and second preimage attacks against several iterated hash function variants also beyond Merkle-Damgåd. Our special interest, Trojan message attacks [1] , can also be based on diamond structures. Now, in the paper [7] , a method to construct diamond structures was also introduced. With intuitive reasoning the authors deduced that to build a diamond structure with 2 d chaining values takes approximately 2 n+d 2 +2 compression function queries. Later a more comprehensive study of diamond structures [3] pointed out that the complexity estimation was too optimistic, the true complexity of the method presented being O(
). We shall demonstrate a new (and, unfortunately, also more intricate) construction algorithm with message complexity O(2 n+d 2 ) for a diamond structure of 2 d chaining values. Our algorithm is based on recycling previously created hash values and message blocks.
The second goal of our paper is to fortify the two Trojan message attacks developed in [1] . Our variant for the weaker Collision Trojan Attack (possessing the complexity O(2 n+r 2 )) is more efficient than the original one (with the complexity O(2 n 2 +r )), and moreover, offers the attacker a greater freedom to choose the content of the second preimage message. The attack algorithm makes use of diamond structures. Finally, we are able to significantly reduce the complexity of the Herding Trojan Attack in our version of strong Trojan message attack. Both expandable messages [8] elongated diamond structures [7] are exploited in our construction.
This paper is organized in the following way. In the next section, our new method to generate a diamond structure is presented. Section 3 contains an introduction to Trojan message attacks. We formulate a new security property and study the complexity of creating a Trojan message attack against a random oracle hash function. In the fourth section two new and efficient variants of Trojan message attacks are developed. The final section contains some conclusive remarks.
Diamond Structures
From now on, assume that our compression function f is a mapping: {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} m → {0, 1} n such that m > n. The message hashing is carried out with the iterative closure f * : {0, 1} n ×({0, 1} m ) * → {0, 1} n of f which is defined inductively as follows. For the empty word , let f * (h, ) := h for all h ∈ {0, 1} n . For each k ∈ N, words x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k+1 ∈ {0, 1} m , and h ∈ {0, 1} n , let
Note that for k = 0 above, x 1 x 2 · · · x k is the empty word and the definition allows us to deduce that f * (h, x 1 ) = f (h, x 1 ). All message lengths are expressed in number of blocks.
Concepts and Tools
Let H ⊆ {0, 1} n be a finite nonempty set of hash values. A pairing set of H is any set B ⊆ H × {0, 1} m such that (i) for each h ∈ H there exists exactly one x ∈ {0, 1} m such that (h, x) ∈ B ; and
The following technical result is eventually applied in evaluating the cardinalities of message block sets when building the diamond structure. 
We continue like this until in the last jump J 1 a pairing set B 1 of H 1 containing only two hash values is generated. The set H 0 := {f (h, x) | (h, x) ∈ B 1 } contains only one element which is the root of the diamond structure. By each jump the distance to the root of the diamond structure is decreased by one. Obviously we are herding the chaining values towards the final hash value which labels the root of our structure. Now each jump consists of several phases; since the structures of jumps are mutually identical, we give below an intuitive description of the phases (and steps) of the jump J d only.
, and so on, ..., in the phase P 2 a pairing set T 1 of a subset
There are two hash values (forming the set K 0 ) still without pairing left in H d , so in the phase P 1 we search a pairing T 0 of K 0 . Then we set
Thus the jump J d consists of d phases after which we have created a pairing set B d of H d ; moreover, it proves to be constructed so that the input set
Steps Each phase is made up of several steps in the following way. Consider the phase P j of jump J d , where j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , d}. As told above, in this phase we create a pairing set for a subset
In each step we create a pairing for two hash values in
so that together the hash values in the pairs form a set K j−1 of cardinality 2 j−1 . A more rigorous description of each step with appropriate input and output follows.
Initialization I(d)
As an input we have a set
. Note that our assumption on the cardinality of the set H d,0 has an insignificant impact to the complexity; we can easily replace the appropriate message blocks one by one with new ones. The output of the initialization step is:
Let now j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , d} and k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2 j−2 − 1}.
Step S(d, j, k) The step takes as an input
, and
A set M j,k of s j,k+1 − s j,k new messages is generated so that the cardinality of the set
is at least one. Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity of computations, we assume that
. Now, what is the (message) complexity of the actions and assumptions above? We may create the message set M j,k as a statistical experiment and then compute the hash values in the set
n , a routine reasoning shows that the probability of finding a colliding pair is greater than 0.5. This means that the expected number of times we have to repeat the experiment is less than two. Thus the message complexity to create the set M j,k , compute the values in f (A j,k , M j,k ), and to find the colliding pair is at most 2 · 2 n−j 2 +1 . Our assumptions on the cardinality of f (A j,k , M j,k ) and of the number of colliding pairs do not increase the complexity significantly. This is ensured by either repeating the experiment sufficiently many times or replacing messages in the set M j,k one by one with new ones.
As an output of this step, we get A j,k+1 , M j,k+1 , H j,k+1 , and B d .
The output of a the step S(d, j, 2 j−2 − 1) (the last step of the phase P j ) serves as the input to the S(d, j − 1, 0) (the first step of the phase P j−1 ) for each j ∈ {3, 4, . . . , d}. We thus define
We carry out our diamond structure construction by running the jumps J d , J d−1 , . . ., J 2 , J 1 one after another in this order. We describe the inner realization of the jump J d more accurately; all the other jumps are carried out completely analogously. The jump J d is implemented by running all its phases I(d), P d , P d−1 , . . ., P 2 , P 1 . The last phase P 1 takes as its input only the set A 1,0 := A 2,1 of two (remaining) hash values and the pairing set B d . It searches a pairing set for A 1,0 on its own. Each phase P j , j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , d}, is realized by running all its steps
Note that in each phase (step, resp.), the message blocks and hash values generated in the previous phases (steps, resp.) are utilized, recycled, one could say. This means that in our method the excessive growth of the message complexity can be prevented. This is verified in the next subsection.
2.3 Diamond Structure Construction Method: The Pseudocode
and
The Overall Message Complexity of the Construction
Let us first compute the message complexity of jump J d ; recall that it consists of phases P d , P d−1 , . . ., P 2 , P 1 . Certainly the complexity of jump J d is the sum of the expected number of compression function enquieries in I(d) and the phases P d , P d−1 , . . ., P 2 , P 1 . Applying Lemma 1 and induction on j and k that s j,k ≥
holds for each j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , d} and k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2 j−2 − 1}. This means that the complexity analysis given in the description of step S(d, j, k) holds. This implies, that given j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , d}, the expected number of compression function queries to carry out phase 
where a is a positive rational smaller than 2 and certainly independent of both n and d.
Remark 1.
As noted above, the probability to find a colliding pair in each step S(d, j, k)is greater than 0.5. It can be shown that we can choose the constant a to be approximately e e−1 when 2 n is sufficiently large.
By the cosiderations above, we can deduce that the complexity of jump J i is at most 2a · 2 n+i 2 for i = 2, 3, . . . , d. Since running the jump J 1 takes approximately 2 · 2 n 2 compression function queries, the overall message complexity of our diamond structure construction is not more than
Reducing the Complexity
It is quite easy to slightly reduce the complexity of the first pairing (i.e., J 1 ) if we can choose the chaining values freely. One can choose an arbitrary hash value set A such that |A| = 2 n+d 2 . After this we can fix a single message block x and compute the value f (h, x) for all h ∈ A. Thus we have 2
hash values and the number of possibly colliding pairs is
Since the codomain of f consists of 2 n elements, there should be approximately 2 d−1 pairs h, h ∈ A such that f (h, x) = f (h , x). We have now found 2 d−1 colliding pairs with the approximate complexity 2 n+d 2 (instead of 2 a · 2 n+d 2 ). As stated before the method presented in this section does not give us optimal complexity. A more effacious approach would be to create new message blocks one by one, to compute the respective hash values, and to search for colliding pairs after each new message block. However, we certainly still need to apply the compression function at least 2 n+d−i 2 times to create 2 d−i pairs and so the total message complexity of our diamond structure construction will thus not drop below O(2 n+d 2 ).
Trojan Message Attacks on Merkle-Damgård Structure
As mentioned before, the Trojan message attack was first presented in [1] . A Trojan message is a nonempty string t produced offline by the attacker and given to the victim. The victim then chooses some word x from a fixed set P of prefixes (also known to the attacker) and forms the word x t. The attacker's task is to find a second preimage for x t. Extra constraints may be imposed to the structure of the preimage depending on the type of the Trojan attack.
In practise a Trojan message attack could happen for example in the following situation. Two parties A (the attacker) and B (the victim) are forming a contract and B is satisfied when choosing the first part of the contract from some set of precreated messages; then A is free to create the rest of the contract to be a Trojan message t. A situation like this could occur, for instance, when A does not know the exact day when the contract will be signed, but is allowed to otherwise formalize its details.
Inspired by the results in [1] , we launch the following security property:
Trojan message resistance. Given any finite message set P , where |P | > 1, it is computationally infeasible to find a message t and a message set M such that |M | = |P | and for each p ∈ P there exists m ∈ M such that H(p t) = H(m).
Assume for a moment that H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n is a random oracle hash function and P is a set of messages with cardinality k ∈ N + . Suppose that M is another set of messages such that |M | = 2 s for some s ∈ N + . The probability that a random message t satisfies the property: for each p ∈ P there exists m ∈ M satisfying H(p t) = H(m), is approximately 2 s 2 n k . Assume now that we create a new message set T where |T | = 2 j , j ∈ N + . The expected number of messages t ∈ T such that for each x ∈ P there exists y ∈ M satisfying H(xt) = H(y) is 2 j · 2 s 2 n k = 2 j+k s−k n .
In order to succesfully complete the attack we should be able to create at least one Trojan message satisfying the given conditions, so the above expected number of messages should certainly be at least one. This means that j + k s − k n ≥ 0.
The number of hash function queries needed is certainly in Ω(2 j + 2 s ). We can minimize the complexity by setting j = s = k n k+1 . So the number of hash function queries needed is in Ω(2 k k+1 ·n ).
It is interesting to see, that this is almost equal to the number of hash function queries needed to create a k−collision [15] .
From now on we consider Trojan message attacks on Merkle-Damgård hash functions; recall that f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n is our compression function and f * : {0, 1} n × ({0, 1} m ) * → {0, 1} n its iterative extension. Assume furthermore that h 0 ∈ {0, 1} n the initial hash value and P = {p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p 2 r } is the set of prefixes, r ∈ N + . Moreover, denote h 0,i := f * (h 0 , p i ) for i = 1, 2, · · · , 2 r . For the sake of simplicity we will assume that all the prefixes in P are of equal length k , k ∈ N + .
As mentioned before, the Andreeva et al [1] offered two variants of Trojan message attacks against Merkle-Damgård structure: the Collision Trojan Attack (abbr. ColTrA) and Herding Trojan Attack (abbr. HerTrA). Both attacks are comprised of three general phases. It is assumed that both the attacker and victim are familiar with the compression function f , the initial hash value h 0 and the prefix set P .
1.
The attacker, Trudy, creates a Trojan message t. The complexity of this phase is the offline complexity of the attack.
2.
The victim, Alice, chooses a prefix message p from the prefix set P , where |P | = 2 r .
3. Trudy creates a second preimage for pt. The complexity of this phase is the online complexity of the attack.
The Collision Trojan Attack
The first phase of ColTrA consists of 2 r step. In the first step the Trudy creates a message block pair x 1 , y 1 such that f (h 0,1 , x 1 ) = f (h 0,1 , y 1 ), x 1 = y 1 . In the step i of the attack, where i ∈ {2, 3, · · · , 2 r }, the attacker computes the value h i−1 = f (h 0,i , x 1 x 2 · · · x i−1 ) and creates a message block pair x i , y i such that f (h i−1 , x i ) = f (h i−1 , y i ) and x i = y i . The attacker chooses then the word t = x 1 x 2 · · · x 2 r for the Trojan message and has thus completed the offline phase of the attack. Assume now that in the second phase Alice chooses a prefix p j and forms the word p j t. The word p j t is passed to Trudy.
In the third phase the attacker first sets t := x 1 x 2 · · · x j−1 y j x j+1 · · · x 2 r and then offers the word p j t for a second preimage to p j t. The attack is successful, since obviously f (h 0 , p j t) = f (h 0 , p j t )). The offline complexity of this attack is O(2 n 2 +r ) while the online complexity is negligible. . Assume now that the final value of the structure is h . Now Trudy creates a message x 0 such that |x 0 | = d. Next she searches for message block pair x 1 , y 1 such that f (h 0,1 , x 0 x 1 ) = f (h , y 1 ), and then sets h 1 := f (h 0,1 , x 0 x 1 ).
In the step i of the first phase, where i ∈ {2, 3, · · · , 2 r }, Trudy computes the value h i−1,i := f (h 0,i , x 0 x 1 · · · x i−1 ) and creates a message block pair x i , y i such that f (h i−1,i , x i ) = f (h i−1 , y i ). Then she simply sets h i := f (h i−1,i , x i ) and is ready to proceed to next step. Finally Trudy creates the Trojan message t = x 0 x 1 · · · x 2 r and has finished the second phase.
Assume now that the attacker is challenged both with a prefix p j , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2 r } and a second prefix w such that the length |w| of w is smaller than k . Trudy now searches for a connection message z such that |wz| = k and f (h 0 , wz) is equal to some for chaining value of the created diamond structure. Assume now that message u is the path from this chaining value to the root hash value h of the diamond structure, i.e. f (h 0 , wzu) = h . Now we have f (h 0 , wzuy
is a second preimage for the word p j t.
The complexity of creating a diamond structure is O(2 n+d 2 ) so the complexity of the offline phase is O(2 n 2 +r + 2 n+d 2 ) while the complexity of finding z is 2 n−d which means that the complexity of the online phase is also 2 n−d . If we want to minimize the total complexity, we can set d = In comparison the second preimage attack presented in [8] and second preimage attack based on diamond structure presented in [2] We shall now present a new variant of the Collision Trojan Attack. The complexity of our construction is lower than that of the original one, while it gives the attacker more freedom to choose the content of the created second preimage. To ensure this we will assume that the attacker is, in addition to the prefix choice p of the victim from the set P , challenged with another prefix v from a set V such that |V | ≤ 2 r in the second phase of the attack. The attacker, Trudy, now has to find suffix s such that f (h 0 , vs) = f (h 0 , pt), where t is the Trojan message created by Trudy in the first phase.
In the first, offline phase Trudy creates a diamond structure with chaining values h 0,1 , h 0,2 , · · · , h 0,2 r . The complexity is certainly O(2 n+r 2 ). Assume now that the final, root hash value of the diamond structure is h . Next the attacker creates an expandable message, starting from the hash value h , with minimum block length r + 1 and maximum block length 2 r+1 + r . The complexity of this effort is O((r + 1) · 2 n 2 ) [8] . Assume that the final hash value of expandable message is h . The attacker now creates a set Y consisting of 2 n+r 2 random message blocks and computes the respective hash values f (h , y) for each y ∈ Y . This requires approximately 2 n+r 2 compression function queries. In addition, the attacker now chooses any message x 0 such that the length of x 0 is 2r + 1. Now Trudy searches for a message block
. The complexity of finding such an x 1 is approximately 2 n−r 2 . The attacker sets y 1 := y and is now ready for the second step of the first phase.
Consider the step i ∈ {2, 3, · · · , 2 r } of the first phase of the attack. Trudy computes h i−1 := f (h 0,i , x 0 x 1 x 2 · · · x i−1 ) and searches for a message block x i such that f (h i−1 , x i ) = f (h , y) for some y ∈ Y . Once again the complexity of finding x i is 2 n−r 2 . Denote h i := f (h i−1 , x i ) and y i := y . Once the attacker has completed the 2 r steps, the offline phase is done. The attacker now forms the Trojan message t = x 0 x 1 x 2 · · · x 2 r .
In the second phase the victim picks from P the prefix p j , where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2 r }. The attacker is also challenged with a second prefix v ∈ V . Assume that z is the expandable message with length j + l and y is the path from f * (h 0 , v) to h , i.e., f * (f * (h 0 , v), y) = h . Obviously f * (h 0 , p j x 0 x 1 · · · x 2 r ) = f * (h 0 , vyzy j x j+1 x j+2 · · · x 2 r ), so clearly vyzy j x j+1 x j+2 · · · x 2 r is a second preimage for p j t.
The messages created in this way have the length k + 2r + 1 + 2 r . The offline complexity of this attack is O(2 n+r 2 ) while the online complexity is negligible. Since ColTrA has the complexity in O(2 n 2 +r ), the advantage of the WeaTrA is obvious.
The Strong Trojan Attack (StrTrA)
We shall use both expandable messages [8] and elongated diamond structures [7] to reduce the complexity of the original HerTrA.
The attacker, Trudy, begins the first phase of the attack by creating a random message z = z 1 z 2 · · · z 2 s , where s ≥ r and z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z 2 s are message blocks. Then she chooses random hash values giving us the total complexity of O(2 n+r 2 ) i.e. the same as in the weak version of the attack. For exampla in SHA-1 the maximum lenght of the message is 2 54 message blocks while n = 160. This implies that if, for example r = 20 we will have 2 n+r 2 = 2 90 if we can choose the length of the message to be 2 50 message blocks. Creating a basic second preimage attacks, presented in [8] and [2] , against messages with that length would have complexity greater than 2 110 , while the complexity of previous version of strong Trojan message attack woud be approximately 2 107 .
In practice messages are of course far shorter. However if we are able to choose, for example s = 
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a better and more efficient versions of Trojan message attacks. By using expandable messages and elongated diamond structures we have been able to reduce the complexity needed to create Trojan message attack significantly. We have also proven that for random oracle hash function the Trojan message complexity should be at least in Ω(2 r r+1 ·n ).
Furhter study is needed to show if it is possible to create even more efficient Trojan message attacks or implement them in practice. Message complexities for Trojan message attacks when the length of the second preimage is in O(2 s ) and the size of the prefix set is 2 r , where r < s . Second preimage attack means the attack presented by Kelsey and Schneier [8] AttCon refers to the controll attacker has over created second preimage in online phase. Restricted prefix means that the attacker can choose the prefix of the second preimage from the pregenerated set with 2 r prefixes. Any prefix means that only the length of the prefix is restricted.
